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abstract
While it is generally acknowledged that the economy has an effect on voting 
behaviour, there has been little work done on that subject in multi-ethnic 
societies. ethnic divisions provide incentives for political participation along 
ethnic lines. this paper investigates the extent to which unemployment 
affects both voter turnout and the electoral success of incumbent parties in 
a multi-ethnic environment. using data based on national electoral results 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the empirical analysis shows that the effect of 
unemployment on voting behaviour is moderated by the level of ethnic division 
in the municipality. economic voting is present in more homogeneous areas, 
in which unemployment seems to account for more electoral mobilization and 
less vote for the incumbent parties. However, the mechanism is not working 
in more ethnically heterogeneous areas. these findings suggest that ethnic 
divisions are encouraging lack of accountability from the incumbent parties 
and exculpate them for poor economic performance.
Key words: economic voting, unemployment, ethnic divisions, political 
accountability
1. Introduction
‘When you think economics, think elections;
When you think elections, think economics.’
(edward r. tufte, Political control of the economy, 1978)
the fundamental rationale behind elections is simple. ‘through elec-




ments and make their preferences heard’ (Sundström and Stock-
emer 2015, 4). once in office, political representatives are expected to 
respond to citizens demands and address them through appropriate 
policy outcomes. voters’ evaluations of the government’s perform-
ance are usually mirrored in their political decisions whether to vote 
or not and their vote choice. thus, besides political representation, the 
question of accountability is central to empirical research in any democ-
racy. Based on the context, it can be measured along different dimen-
sions. nevertheless, the reward – punishment hypothesis has prominently 
been examined with regard to economic performance. ‘In order to ascer-
tain whether the incumbents have performed poorly or well, citizens only 
need to calculate the changes in their own welfare’ (Fiorina 1981, 5). Hence, 
the link between economic performance and electoral outcomes, known 
as ‘economic voting’, became very popular in research on retrospective 
(performance) voting (rosenstone 1982; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). 
economic voting refers to the influence of the economy, at a given time 
point, on voting patterns. Put simply, it posits that ‘when the economy 
is doing well, voters will vote for the political party in power; but when 
the economy is performing badly, voters will vote against the incum-
bent party’ (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 183). Indeed, there is a firm 
consensus within the academic literature regarding the link between 
high or rising unemployment (as an macro-economic indicator) and 
‘anti-incumbent’ voting (anderson 2000; downs 1957; Bengtsson 2004; 
jonathan rogers, Marcelo tyszler 2012).
However, while there is a consensus that vote shares received by the 
incumbent depend heavily on economic conditions, scholars disagree 
on the effect of economic factors on voter turnout. notably, two rival 
set of explanations have emerged from the literature. the first set of 
explanations argue that unemployment reduces voter turnout, because 
economic hardship makes citizens less likely to vote (radcliff 1992, 1994; 
rosenstone 1982; Southwell 1988). In marked contrast, the second set 
of explanations contends that economic hardship, and especially high 
levels of unemployment, strongly encourages voter turnout. as citi-
zens are more responsive to difficult economic circumstances and negative 
news, economic hardship has a mobilizing effect (Bloom and Price 1975, 
Kernell 1977, Fiorina and Shepsle 1990). It is worth noting at this point, 
however, that a limited number of studies have asserted that there is 
no relationship between the economic situation and turnout (arcelus 
and Meltzer, 1975, Fiorina, 1978).
to date, studies of economic voting have predominantly focused on the 
cases of established democracies–and notably, the united States of america 
(uSa) (Lewis Back and Stegmaier (2000, 184), where economic issues are 
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often of central importance for the general population. Much less attention 
has been paid to the distinct experience of ethnically-divided societies, 
despite their inherent suitability as a test-case. ethnically-divided societies 
are frequently characterized by the prevalence of ethnic parties and ethnic 
voting patterns, even in the face of significant and publically-recognized 
economic challenges. But to what extent do ethnic voting patterns super-
sede economic voting? Is there a relationship between unemployment rates 
and voter turnout in multi-ethnic societies? this paper analyses whether 
unemployment affects both voter turnout and incumbents’ vote share in a 
context in which it has not been analyzed before: divided ethnic societies 
with elements of consociationalism, which aims at fair representation of 
different ethnic groups, but provides further incentives for political partic-
ipation along ethnic lines.
In this paper, I argue that economic voting does exist in ethnically-
divided societies. appreciative of the fact that deciding for which polit-
ical party to vote is much more complex and voting behaviour is a result 
of multiple factors, the aim of this paper is to fill in a small part of the 
‘funnel’ showing that unemployment level influences voting behaviour 
and turnout even in a multi-ethnic context, where ethnic parties form a 
basis for the political system, per se. However, I hypothesize that the effect 
of unemployment on voting behaviour is influenced by the level of ethnic 
divisions. as such, economic voting patterns should be more likely to be 
discernible in areas characterized by a homogenous ethnic makeup. In this 
scenario, high levels of unemployment should mobilize citizens to turn 
out to vote against the incumbent political parties. thus, unemployment 
should have a positive effect on voter turnout and a negative effect on vote 
share for the incumbent parties. In contrast, in ethnically-heterogeneous 
areas I expect the effect of unemployment on voting behaviour to vanish: 
I predict no economic voting in these areas. this is because voters in areas 
where no ethnic group has majority status are more likely to refrain from 
punishing incumbent politicians for poor economic performance out of 
fear that the political representatives from other ethnic groups may gain 
relative political advantage. In short, areas characterized by an ethnically 
diverse population are more likely to display ethnic, rather than economic 
voting patterns. Consequently, I expect unemployment rates to have little 
to no effect on voter turnout and vote share for incumbent parties. 
economic voting in this study is evaluated on the basis of aggregate 
level data, by looking at the link between the unemployment rate, as the 
country’s macroeconomic indicator, and national election results at the 
local level. the study focuses on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as 
a ‘least likely’ case (Levy 2008; rohlfing 2012) for non-ethnic (economic) 




this paper generates insights on the existence of alternative voting patterns 
in an ethnically-divided society. In this way, the paper adds to contempo-
rary scholarship by enlarging the evidence base–and in particular, by rein-
forcing the link between the economy and electoral outcomes in ethni-
cally-divided societies.
2. Previous research
Prior research on voting behaviour has shown vote intention and vote 
choice to differ due to disparate resources, interests and incentives on the 
individual level, related with socio-economic, political and institutional 
characteristics at the aggregate-level (Geys 2006; verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995). More specific discussion regarding the effects of economic 
conditions on vote choice emerged within the literature in the mid-twen-
tieth century (downs 1957). Many scholars have argued that voters’ percep-
tion of their government’s economic performance directly and consistently 
affects their voting patterns (for an overview see: Lewis-Beck and Paldam 
2000). the common standpoint is that, voters will cast a vote and reward 
the government if the economy is strong and vote against (punish) the 
government if the economy deteriorates (rowe 2013). earlier studies of 
economic voting have confirmed that incumbent governments are held 
responsible for the success or stagnation of the economy, and are accord-
ingly punished or re-elected. as Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000, 211) have 
argued, ‘citizens’ dissatisfaction with economic performance substantially 
increases the probability of a vote against the incumbent’. this type of 
economic voting is known as ‘incumbency-oriented’ voting (dassonnev-
ille and Lewis-Beck 2013).
the literature has refined its initial simplistic argument to include two 
conditions for the existence of economic voting. First, the attribution of 
responsibility to the government for economic performance (anderson 
2000; nadeau, niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Powell and Whitten 1993). 
Second, the existence of political alternatives, which offer citizens the 
opportunity to express their discontent by voting for another party (Lewis-
Beck, 1988; anderson, 2000, 2007). according to Williams et al. ‘in the 
case of cabinets controlled by one party, voters can easily identify which 
party or leader is responsible for the country’s economic situation’, whereas 
‘coalition governments can make it more difficult for voters to assign credit 
or blame’ (Williams, Stegmaier, and debus 2017, 1,3). different levels of 
government and coalition formations (anderson 2007), i.e. when there is 
no clear-cut incumbent government, add additional complexity towards 
this research. thus, with regard to the first condition, many studies 
analyzed economic voting in countries with multi-level systems, where 
potentially different responsibility attribution applies. For such cases which 
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are complicated by coalition governments and assume weaker economic 
voting for the coalition as a whole, recent research showed that voters do 
still engage in economic voting by targeting the major party in the coali-
tion, i.e. the party of the Prime minister (Williams, Stegmaier, and debus 
2017; debus, Stegmaier, and tosun 2014). Furthermore, even in cases when 
coalition formations show an obstacle for the evaluation of the govern-
ment’s economic performance, the literature found that voters are expected 
to hold the national government accountable for local (municipal) unem-
ployment conditions when local and national economic conditions are 
correlated and when unemployment is a socially-centered and politicized 
issue, which is the case in high-unemployment contexts such it is in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Incantalupo 2011), but also in cases where parties in local 
leadership and national government overlap. 
However, the link between economic hardship and electoral turnout 
has been less studied in the literature. the idea that the economy 
affects voter turnout was initially developed by rosenstone (1982) and 
radcliff (1992). In their seminal works, the authors found that indi-
vidual economic downturns have a demobilizing effect on voting behav-
iour and people are less likely to vote. the withdrawal from the polit-
ical system is predominantly explained by reduced resources, feelings of 
alienation and greater attention given to the individual’s own personal 
circumstances. the dominant message conveyed through the scholarly 
literature is that economic hardship has a discouraging effect on citi-
zens, making them less active on the political scene. Later on, further 
scholarly contributions confronted these results with different find-
ings. one of the central developments refers to the finding of a mobi-
lizing effect of unemployment on voter turnout. the mobilizing effect 
of economic hardship on electoral participation is partially linked to 
empirical findings which show that voters reactions to negative changes 
are more intense than reactions towards positive changes (alvarez, 
nagler, and Willette 2000). this is known as the ‘grievance asymmetry’ 
(Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). rowe additionally contributed to this 
debate by claiming that the ‘decision to vote or not is also contingent 
upon who there is to vote for, and not solely upon whether the macr-
oeconomy is good or bad, or whether a person is better off now rather 
than six months ago’(rowe 2013, 806). Lack of alternatives for which citi-
zens could cast a vote, could undermine the economic vote and result 
in abstention (rowe 2013).
nonetheless, the literature on economic voting received an over-
whelming empirical confirmation for advanced industrial democ-
racies (dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2013; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 




rowe 2013; Powell and Whitten 1993; alvarez, nagler, and Willette 2000; 
Weschle 2013). So did the investigations of the economy and turnout 
(Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Southwell 1988; rosenstone 1982; Wolfinger 
and rosenstone 1980; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). even though the litera-
ture has evolved and covered more and more countries, it has paid almost 
no attention to ethnically-divided countries. research has thus neglected 
the link between economy and vote choice in ethnically-divided societies, 
where ethnicity is a salient issue and ethnic representation is commonly 
a more important aspect than accountability. Similarly, little attention 
has been paid to the relationship between economic hardship and voter 
turnout in such societies. Indeed, ethnically-divided societies represent a 
least likely case for economic voting patterns, as economic concerns are 
likely to be overtaken by ethnically-motivated matters. representation of 
ethnic groups and their empowerment through democratic institutions 
often receive priority in these contexts. the aim is to guarantee these 
ethnic groups to peacefully cohabitate without ethnic conflict and not to 
underestimate, it is often the only solution for keeping a divided country 
together. Moreover, ethnically-divided countries are under-researched with 
regard to economic voting due to the fact that government responsibility 
is more easily assigned in two-party political systems than in collective 
governance systems (power sharing coalitions), which are frequently in 
place in these societies which are divided along ethnic lines. this lack of 
‘clarity of responsibility’ (anderson 2000) may also account for the limited 
research. the incumbent government is commonly composed of the 
main and most popular ethnic parties representing each ethnic group. 
this is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but certainly this selected 
case study is no exception. to defect and vote for the opposition, would 
mean for the voter to vote for a less ethnic, multi-ethnic or non-ethnic 
party. Some authors consider this contrast to be more appropriate and 
precise to measure economic voting, rather than the contrast between 
incumbents and non-incumbents. However, as regards the theory of 
economic voting in classic terms, it is incumbency oriented so that 
the ‘elector judges past economic performance, and on the basis of that 
assessment votes for or against the political incumbent’(Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2008, 303). Lack of alternatives for which citizens could cast 
a vote or present alternatives which the voter does not perceive suffi-
ciently ethnic in their nature, could thus undermine the economic vote 
and result in abstention (rowe 2013).
For these reasons, previous research on voting behaviour in ethni-
cally-divided societies has focused primarily on ethnic voting patterns 
and existing incentives for such behaviour, such as institutional factors 
(i.e. Pr electoral systems and consociationalism), strong ethnic identifica-
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tion, ethnic antagonisms, fear and anxiety (Bieber 1999, 2003, 2011; Barry 
1975; Bogaards 1998; andeweg 2000). to a large extent, ethnic voting has 
been attributed to the presence of the consociational elements, which are 
embedded in their democratic structures (Hulsey 2010; Manning 2004; 
Caspersen 2004). arend Lijphard (1977, 1975) coined the concept of conso-
ciational democracy, as an archetypal interpretation of power-sharing. It 
aims at fair representation of different ethnic groups, but ironically provides 
further incentives for political participation along ethnic lines (Lijphart 
1975, 1977, 1997, 1999). Consociationalism is envisaged as a guarantee for a 
solid democratic future, by offering political representatives from different 
ethnic groups equal share of political power: that is to say, proportional 
representation (touquet 2011). the rigid institutional design promoted 
by consociationalism is mostly visible through highly decentralized state 
structures. as noted by touquet, ‘each group must legally be represented 
in a grand coalition government’ (p. 452). Public administration is also 
based on the principle of proportionality (touquet 2011). the whole polit-
ical system is basically built on ethnic divisions and ethnic parties, aiming 
primarily to offer equal representation for each ethnic group. ethnic voting 
is consequently mostly practiced in such divided societies, due to the fear 
of underrepresentation of one’s own ethnic group and regardless of the 
government’s economic performance. thus, accountability is perceived 
to be of second priority in these contexts. ethnic representation comes 
first. Many consider consociationalism to be a good characteristic because 
the minorities are given collective rights and equal representation in the 
government (Cohen 1997; Lijphart 1977, 1999). nevertheless, proportional 
representation (as an important consociational feature) has been criti-
cized by many scholars for mobilizing voters along ethnic lines (Horowitz 
1985; reilly et al. 1999; rokkan 2009; Sisk and reynolds 1998; Wilkinson 
2006) and for exculpating incumbent governments for poor performance, 
including but not limited to the aspect of economy. 
3. an alternative argument 
the aim of this paper is to challenge the dominant standpoint that in an 
ethnically-divided society there is only ethnic voting behaviour. I argue 
that in an ethnically-divided society higher levels of unemployment stim-
ulate more people to vote and despite the inducing factors for ethnic voting 
patterns (i.e. elements of consocationalism), economic voting is present 
even in such societies. Specifically, this article aims to show that the effect 
of unemployment on both voter turnout and vote share for incumbent 
parties is moderated by the level of ethnic divisions at the municipality 
level. What is expected is that in more homogeneous areas with less ethnic 




ployment is expected to have a positive effect on voter turnout and a nega-
tive effect on the vote share for incumbent parties in homogeneous areas. 
Building upon the ‘responsibility hypothesis’, which presumes that the 
‘voter observes the economy, judges its performance and alters his/her 
vote accordingly by rewarding or punishing the incumbent’ (Lewis-Beck 
and Paldam 2000, 119), citizens are supposed to hold the representatives 
accountable for the economic downturn and the economic hardship is 
expected to mobilize them to a higher degree in order to express their 
discontent and punish the responsible ones.
By contrast, in more heterogeneous areas the effect of unemploy-
ment on voting behaviour and turnout will vanish. I predict no economic 
voting in these areas. the reason is that economic voting in mixed ethnic 
communities could lead to an unfavourable zero-sum situation. In these 
areas where no ethnic group is the majority, it is more risky and costly to 
punish the members of government which you hold responsible for the 
high unemployment because this may help representatives of the other 
group to grow more powerful. Consequently, in more heterogeneous areas 
I expect unemployment to have no effect on both turnout and vote share 
for incumbent parties. 
4. Case selection
Following the theory based case selection strategy, Bosnia and Herze-
govina was chosen as a least likely case for non ethnic (economic) voting. 
Besides being economically undeveloped, institutionally divided and inef-
ficient, religiously and ethnically heterogeneous, it is mainly a suitable 
case study due to the ‘politicized ethnicity’ (Weber, Hiers, and Flesken 
2015), which makes ethnicity a cornerstone of politics and the party system, 
itself (Hulsey 2010; Manning 2004; Caspersen 2004). thus, determining if 
Bosnian voters evaluate economic performance of the incumbent parties or 
if they rather take primordial alternatives based on ethnicity, poses a valu-
able task. Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a deeply divided society. 
ethnic divisions are omnipresent and ethnicity is a salient issue. according 
to Kapidžić ‘in Bosnia and Herzegovina we may talk about segmented 
multi-party system with four party subsystems based on ethno-political 
social cleavages’ (Kapidžić 2017). annex 4 of the dayton agreement func-
tions as the country’s Constitution, which sought to freeze ethnic divisions 
and introduced a model of consociational democracy (power sharing). 
ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been given constitutional 
significance, being described as ‘constituent peoples’. Significantly, ‘a large 
autonomy for each ethnic group is guaranteed through the highly decen-
tralized state structure’ (touquet 2011, 453). the first article of the consti-
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tution addresses the composition of the country, stating that ‘Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shall consist of the two entities, the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the republika Srpska (hereinafter ‘the entities’)’. 
Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are referred to as constituent peoples (along 
with others). according to Kivimäki at al. ‘the prime division of the conflict 
appears to be the disagreement on the form of the state, that is, whether 
it should continue to be a unitary state with the borders as they are today, 
or whether the door to territorial secession of the entities and/or ethnic 
groups should be opened’(Kivimäki, Kramer, and Pasch 2012, 19). Further-
more, it is important to note that the ethnic differences are the crux of the 
fragmented political party system. almost all parties represent and appeal 
to one certain group. Party competition does not exist in Bosnia across 
ethnic lines. one main reason for that are the strict implications of the 
consociational elements. Consociational elements, such as proportional 
representation, grand coalition, segmental autonomy and veto rights are 
incorporated in the constitution of the country and institutionalized. all 
the basic state-political institutions in Bosnia are structured according 
to the principle of proportionality and parity (Kasapović 2005). By and 
large, Bosnia is institutionally designed to accommodate ethnic divi-
sions, promoting and aiming rather for representation, than for account-
ability. However, it is worthwhile to ask if the importance of ethnic iden-
tity does necessarily translate into ethnic voting and what role do economic 
conditions play? unemployment is a social phenomenon and one of the 
greatest public concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. this ‘unemployment-
in-Context’, as framed by Incantalupo, makes the Bosnian electorate an 
interesting target group (Incantalupo 2011). Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
newly democratized country, held captured by its overemphasized ethnic 
divisions which are embedded in the institutional framework. therefore, 
considerable attention has been put on explaining the influence of ethnic 
identity, state structures and institutions on existent voting patterns. By 
testing the hypothesis of economic voting behaviour in a party system 
where ethnic parties are dominant and institutional factors conducive 
for ethnic voting behaviour, the empirical analysis of Bosnia and Herze-
govina deepens our understanding of the role played by consociational 
elements, including other, similar cases in which ethnic voting would also 
have been more likely to assume. Furthermore, the case study under obser-
vation allows for the testing of the economic voting theory with regard to 
the level of ethnic divisions within the country. In this way, it is possible 
to identify variations of voting behaviour and voter turnout on the basis 
of different levels of ethnic divisions. 
Consociational features like those present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 




challenges. as a result, this research has implications for other ethnically-
-divided societies. 
5. data 
the ideal data set for this study would be a comprehensive survey of indi-
viduals immediately after an election, in order to gather information on 
the evaluation of government economic performance, whether they had 
voted, for which party they voted and if they did not, why not. However, 
unlike in many democratic countries, pre- and post-election surveys do not 
exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Funding, resource and access issues have 
meant that I have not been able to gather individual data of the population 
to provide an accurate, reliable and unbiased account of voting patterns.
In order to overcome the absence of reliable survey data regarding 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and for the purpose of the analysis, I have creat-
ed a dataset that includes: the 2014 national election results disaggre-
gated by municipality; municipal unemployment rates computed with 
data obtained from the agency for statistics of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the republika Srpska Institute of Statistics; and data 
available on ethnic composition of municipalities from the 2013 popula-
tion census in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Whilst recognizing the limitations of drawing inferences about indi-
vidual behaviour from aggregated data (ecological fallacy (Kramer 1983), 
individual level data are perhaps not even necessary for the purpose of 
this study. namely, economic factors could have an impact on voting 
behaviour, even if citizens as voters are not aware of those. ultimately, 
this would hinder them to express their genuine motives at the ballot 
box.
6. operationalization 
as an indicator of the state of the economy, I use the unemployment rate, 
broken down by municipality. unemployment is considered to be the most 
tangible measure of national economic performance. Previous research 
indicates that while voters show to have a limited knowledge of the macro-
economy, they are relatively well informed on the issue of unemployment 
(aidt; Paldam and nannested in Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). the unem-
ployment rate is calculated as the total number of unemployed citizens out 
of the total number of working age population. 
official electoral results at the municipal level were obtained from 
the Central election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 
year 2014. two variables are constructed. the first variable is voter 
turnout which is operationalized as the percentage of citizens who 
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voted out of the percentage of registered voters. the second variable 
is the incumbents’ vote share. this variable is operationalized as the 
percentage of votes received by the parties that were in office during 
the previous political term (2010–2014) out of the total valid votes. out 
of the 65 parties, 24 independent candidates and 24 coalitions that 
were eligible to run for general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
six political parties were part of the coalition government at that time1, 
namely: the alliance of Independent Social democrats (SnSd), the 
Serbian democratic Party (SdS), the Social democratic Party (SdP), 
the Party of democratic action (Sda) the Croatian of Independent 
Social democrats (SnSd), the Serbian democratic Party (SdS), the 
Social democratic Party (SdP), the Party of democratic action (Sda) 
the Croatian democratic union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HdZ), and 
the Croatian democratic union 1990. 
data from the 2013 census has been used to determine the ethnic 
composition of the population. I estimate the level of ethnic divisions 
by a variable ranging from 1–3. value 1 is attributed to the municipality 
if one ethnic group is the majority representing more than 80 percent 
of the total population; value 2 is endorsed to the municipality if one 
ethnic group accounts for more than 60 percent of the population; 
and value 3 is used if none of the ethnic groups represent a majority in 
terms of the number of inhabitants. Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided 
into 141 municipalities. nevertheless, as figures on unemployment are 
not available in six municipalities2, the total number of units of anal-
ysis is 135.
7. results
due to the small number of units of analysis (n=135 municipalities), I 
use bivariate analysis for the purpose of determining the empirical rela-
tionship between unemployment and election results. table 1 presents 
the basic descriptive statistics of the computed variables, providing a 
preliminary summary of the data.
1 data obtained through Central election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, www.
izbori.ba





N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.  Deviation
Unemployment rate 135 1.25 38.00 18.72 6.76
Turnout rate 135 19.18 76.33 51.03 9.82
Incumbents’ vote share 135 29.08 97.50 63.39 15.49
Level of ethnic division 135 1.00 3.00 1.50 .81
Valid N (listwise) 135
Descriptive Statistics
the large differences in unemployment rates between municipalities could 
have various causes. they may be a result of the supply side, since in many 
rural municipalities work is in short supply and accessing the job market 
is for many very difficult. It is even more difficult for reasons of patronage 
practices. Political patronage as a trade of public sector jobs in exchange for 
votes is very common in such ethnically-divided and economically under-
developed societies. thus, not being close to the patron (political party), 
results in fewer employment chances. With regards to the private sector, 
there are fewer opportunities and certainly a mismatch between smaller 
and bigger municipalities, as well as poorer and more developed munici-
palities, which can account for the existent discrepancy in unemployment 
rates. Political patronage and voter disenchantment are to a certain extent 
also reasons for the different turnout rates.
as mentioned in the previous sections, unemployment is expected to 
have a positive effect on voter turnout and a negative effect on the vote 
share for the incumbent parties in ethnically homogeneous municipalities. 
By contrast, in heterogeneous areas the effect of unemployment on voting 
behaviour should vanish. therefore, in ethnically heterogeneous areas I 
expect no effect of unemployment on turnout and vote for the incumbent 
parties. I argue that in more divided areas citizens of one ethnic group fear 
the growing power of the representatives of the other group, and so will 
not punish the incumbent even if the economy is struggling.
the relation between unemployment rate and election results is 
assessed using Pearson’s correlation analysis. Municipalities have been clas-
sified in three groups from less to more ethnic heterogeneity (see section 
6) and correlation coefficients have been computed taken each group sepa-
rately. the results are showed in table 1. the coefficients in the first column 
show the relation between unemployment rate and voter turnout. the 
coefficients in the second column show the relation between unemploy-
ment rate and incumbents’ vote share.
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Table 2: Pearson’s correlation coefficients for relation between unemployment 
rate and voter turnout, and for unemployment rate and incumbents’ vote share, 
by level of ethnic division
Level of ethnic  
division
Voter Turnout Incumbents’ Vote 
Share
1 (low) 0,207* -0,479**
2 (medium) -0,132 -0,291
3 (high) -0,006 0,570**
* p<0,05, **p<0,01, *** p<0,001 
7.1. unemployment rate and voter turnout
Starting with the first column of table 2, the Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficient for the relation between unemployment rate and voter turnout is 
0,207 for the municipalities with low levels of ethnic division. although 
the correlation is low, is statistically significant (p<0,05). the higher 
the unemployment rate, the more voter turnout in municipalities with 
less ethnic heterogeneity. I interpret this finding as evidence suggesting 
that in more ethnically homogeneous areas, unemployment has a 
mobilizing effect. abstention decreases in municipalities with high 
unemployment rates. However, in municipalities with medium and, 
specially, high levels of ethnic division, the correlation between unem-
ployment rate and voter turnout is almost non-existent and the coeffi-
cients are not statistically significant. In ethnically heterogeneous areas, 
economic conditions seem to be independent from voter turnout. these 
data confirm my expectations. While unemployment mobilize voters 
in ethnically homogeneous municipalities, citizens in more divided 
areas do not react to economic conditions.
another way to identify the type of relation between economic 
conditions and voter turnout is graphically. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot 
for unemployment rate and voter turnout. trend lines at the different 
groups of municipalities according to the level of ethnic division (low, 




Figure 1: Scatter plot for unemployment and voter turnout by level of ethnic 
divisions
independent from voter turnout. These data confirm my expectations. While 
unemployment mobilize voters in ethnically homogeneous municipalities, citizens in 
more divided areas do not react to economic conditions. 
Another way to identify the type of relation between economic conditions and voter 
turnout is graphically. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot for unemployment rate and voter 
turnout. Trend lines at the different groups of municipalities according to the level of 
ethnic division (low, medium and high) have been added. 
Figure 1 
Scatter plot for unemployment and voter turnout by level of ethnic divisions 
According to Figure 1, expectations regarding the effect of unemployment on voter turnout 
are confirmed. As hypothesized, there is a positive relation between unemployment rate and 
voter turnout with regard to homogeneous areas. As such, unemployment accounts for a 
mobilizing effect on turnout in municipalities where one ethnic group is numerically 
according to Figure 1, expectations regarding the effect of unemployment 
on voter turnout are confirmed. as hypothesized, there is a positive rela-
tion between unemployment rate and voter turnout with regard to homo-
geneous areas. as such, unemployment accounts for a mobilizing effect on 
tu t in municipalities where one thnic group is numerically dominant 
representing more than 80 per cent of the total population. By contrast, 
the increase of unemployment has no effect on turnout in less homoge-
neous areas, as suggested by the almost flat trend lines for medium and 
high levels of ethnic division.
7.2. unemployment rate and incumbents’ vote share
regarding the relation between economic conditions and vote share for 
the incumbent parties, the second column of table 2 shows that the rela-
tion between unemployment rate and incumbents’ vote share also depends 
on the level of ethnic division in the municipality. the Pearson correla-
tion coefficient is negative and statistically significant for ethnically homo-
geneous municipalities. that means that the higher the unemployment 
rate, the less vote share for the incumbent parties in areas with low levels 
of ethnic divisions. this goes in the direction established by my expecta-
tions, which lays out that economic voting exists in such ethnically homo-
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geneous areas and incumbent government is accordingly punished for poor 
economic performance with the loss of votes.
Figure 2: Scatter plot for unemployment and vote share for the incumbents 
by level of ethnic divisions
To sum up, analysis indicates that unemployment is positively associated with voter turnout 
only in municipalities with low levels of ethnic divisions, although correlation is low. The 
relation of unemployment and vote share for the incumbent parties seems to be stronger. 
Pearson coefficients are close or even above +/-0.5. In ethnically homogeneous municipalities 
the more unemployment, the less vote for the incumbent. However, the relation is the opposite 
in municipalities with high levels of ethnic division. In ethnically heterogeneous 
municipalities, incumbents’ vote share increases as the economic situation worsens.
8. Conclusion 
This paper builds on the academic literature that investigates how the economy influences 
voting behaviour, which has to date tended to focus on more developed democracies. By 
looking at an ethnically divided society with different levels of ethnic divisions, this study has 
However, this is not the case in ethnically heterogeneous areas, where we 
observe the opposite scenario. I expected no relation between unemploy-
ment rate and support for the incumbent parties in non-homogeneous 
municipalities. In the light of the results of the Pearson correlation anal-
ysis, it is so in municipalities wit  medium levels of ethnic divisions, where 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. However, in municipalities 
with high levels of ethnic divisions the correlation coefficient between 
unemployment and incumbents’ vote share is statistically significant and 
has a value of 0,57, which indicates a strong positive relationship (p<0,01). 
thus, again as initially expected, the igher the unemployment rate, the 
more vote share for the incumbent parties in ethnically heterogeneous 
municipalities. this finding seems contradictory, but may be explained by 
the concept of political patronage. Political patronage was shown to work 
better when ethnic divisions are more salient (Chandra 2007; Weingrod 
1968; Kurtovic 2013). It creates ‘an instrumental, benefit – seeking voter’ 
(Chandra 2007:13) who is led by patronage benefits and economic security. 




positive correlation between unemployment and votes for the incumbent 
in heterogeneous areas can intuitively be explained by the expectations of 
the ethnic group members, that the electoral support of the incumbent 
will reward them with patronage benefits. In other words, if unemploy-
ment is high, the hope for public employment and benefits related with it, 
makes the citizens shut their eyes to the struggling national economy, as 
long as a ‘strategic vote’ for the incumbent can help them to improve their 
own financial security. the scatter plot showed in Figure 2 makes easier 
the interpretation of the relation between unemployment rate and vote 
share for the incumbent parties. 
to sum up, analysis indicates that unemployment is positively associ-
ated with voter turnout only in municipalities with low levels of ethnic divi-
sions, although correlation is low. the relation of unemployment and vote 
share for the incumbent parties seems to be stronger. Pearson coefficients 
are close or even above +/-0.5. In ethnically homogeneous municipalities 
the more unemployment, the less vote for the incumbent. However, the 
relation is the opposite in municipalities with high levels of ethnic divi-
sion. In ethnically heterogeneous municipalities, incumbents’ vote share 
increases as the economic situation worsens.
8. Conclusion
this paper builds on the academic literature that investigates how the 
economy influences voting behaviour, which has to date tended to focus on 
more developed democracies. By looking at an ethnically-divided society 
with different levels of ethnic divisions, this study has sought to test the 
economic voting theory in a new context. It is a context where ethnicity 
is a salient issue, ethnic representation is of primary importance and the 
whole political system was envisaged to accommodate ethnic divisions 
and avoid further ethnic conflicts, rather than to ensure accountability. 
this political context of an ethnically-divided society makes it appealing 
to examine whether voters in these circumstances hold incumbents to 
account for poor economic performance and if there is any relation-
ship between unemployment and voter turnout. the paper argues that 
economic voting does exist in divided societies and that the unemploy-
ment rate mobilizes citizens to vote, rather than making them with-
draw from the political realm. 
the results reveal, however, that the effect of economic conditions 
on voting behaviour is moderated by the level of ethnic divisions in the 
municipality. economic voting is present in more homogeneous areas, 
in which unemployment has a double effect. on one hand, it seems to 
account for more electoral mobilization (higher voter turnout). on the 
other hand, it decreases vote shares for the incumbent parties. never-
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theless, the results are not the same for more ethnically heterogeneous 
municipalities, in which there is not a numerically dominant ethnic 
group. In fact, in areas in which the level of ethnic divisions is high, 
unemployment rate does not affect voter turnout. In such scenario, the 
analysis has showed even higher support of the incumbent parties as 
unemployment rate increases. the higher support of the incumbent is 
assumed to be evident due to reasons of patronage benefits these voters 
may more easily acquire if the incumbent parties (representing their 
ethnic group) are in power. For the incumbent parties such a political 
setting is suitable and according to the concept ‘divide and rule’, this 
strategy enables them not to be responsive of citizens’ preferences and 
needs, but to be reelected, nonetheless. they keep encouraging divi-
sions among the different ethnic groups, in order to get exculpated for 
poor performance.
taken together, these results tell a rather sad story. they show 
that ethnic divisions are encouraging lack of accountability from the 
incumbent parties, which reiterate other findings, also using munici-
pality-level data although with a slightly different focus (Hulsey 2010; 
Manning 2004; Caspersen 2004). this study, however, relates to the 
economic dimension. taking into consideration that governments can 
be held accountable along different dimensions, it may be a sign of 
accountability along the ethnic dimension. nevertheless, the findings 
of this study show that the rational calculus of voting as seen by downs 
(1957) is not entirely applicable in divided societies. not all individuals 
do vote for the political party that provides them with the highest level 
of individual benefits–that is to say, out of self-interest. remembering 
that ethnically-divided and conflicted societies lack ethnic safety, secu-
rity and integrity of the state in general, voters give importance to these 
aspects, as well.
despite the fact that the results of this study are inferred from aggre-
gates to individuals and are open to ecological fallacy charges, a number 
of other studies have confirmed the analysis of aggregate data as a reli-
able and accurate method of data collection. Besides, individual level 
data are perhaps not necessary for the purpose of this study, because 
economic factors could be influencing voting behaviour, even if citi-
zens as voters are not conscious of those. ultimately, this would hinder 
them to express their genuine motives at the ballot box. 
the present research reveals some interesting findings while testing 
the hypothesis that community-level ethnic diversity affects the magni-
tude of the economic vote and level of turnout.  as far as economic 
conditions are concerned, which this research linked to voting behav-




By expanding the research and looking at unemployment rates over 
time, the argument would be highly strengthened.
this study has introduced the question of economic voting in a new 
setting, namely an ethnically-divided society. It encourages further 
research on this topic, both in terms of a wider pool of case coun-
tries, as well as further testing the argument for the same case by using 
different data sources and time series data. 
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Sažetak
Zavadi, pa vladaj: ekonomsko glasanje u etnički  
podjeljenim državama – Slučaj Bosne i Hercegovine
uprkos opće prihvaćenom stajalištu da ekonomija ima značajan utjecaj na 
glasačko ponašanje, jako malo akademske pažnje je do sada posvećeno dubljoj 
analizi ovog pitanja u multietničkim državama. etničke podjele daju poticaj 
političkoj participaciji po osnovu etničke pripadnosti. ovaj rad se bavi pitanjem 
da li nezaposlenost utiče na izlaznost na izbore i izborni uspjeh vladajućih 
stranaka i u kojoj mjeri je to slučaj u multietničkim sredinama. Koristeći 
podatke o izbornim rezultatima na općim izborima u Bosni i Hercegovini, 
empirijska analiza pokazuje da je uticaj nezaposlenosti na glasačko ponašanje 
uvjetovan obimom etničkih podjela u lokalnim jedinicama. tako je ekonomsko 
glasanje prisutno u homogenim sredinama, u kojima nezaposlenost podstiče 
glasačku mobilizaciju, ali doprinosi i smanjenju glasova za vladajuće stranke. 
Ipak, u etnički heterogenim sredinama to nije slučaj. dobijeni rezultati ukazuju 
na to da etničke podjele doprinose nedostatku političke odgovornosti vladajućih 
stranaka i iste ekskulpiraju za loša ekonomska dostignuća tijekom njihovog 
mandata.
Ključne riječi: ekonomsko glasanje, nezaposlenost, etničke podjele, politička 
odgovornost.
